1. Introduction and Conceptual Foundation
In the practice of insider risk management, there is often a tendency to focus exclusively on acute acts of harm; data exfiltration, sabotage, and unauthorized disclosure. But these outcomes are seldom sudden. More often, they represent the final step in a longer behavioral trajectory that begins with relatively minor, individually tolerable infringements.
At Forscie, we refer to this phenomenon as
1.1 Definitions
1.1.1 Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
A formal document, or collection of related policies, that defines the expectations, responsibilities, and limitations placed on individuals in their use of organization-owned systems, services, networks, and assets. It establishes the behavioral and technical boundaries required to protect operational integrity, ensure compliance, and preserve trust.
A well-constructed AUP should adopt a permissive legal model, meaning it is framed by the principle that “what is not prohibited is permitted.” To support clarity and enforceability, the policy should focus on explicit prohibitions, using directive language such as “must not,” “will not,” or “is prohibited.” This approach provides clear behavioral guardrails for the population, enabling both users and enforcement functions to understand what constitutes a violation.
1.1.2 Volume Infringements
Minor, frequently occurring violations of organizational policy, security controls, or behavioral expectations. While individually low impact, they collectively indicate patterns of noncompliance that may signify behavioral drift, normalization of deviance, or weakening organizational control.
1.1.3 Subject
An individual within the population who has been identified as a focus of interest in the context of behavioral analysis, policy violations, or insider threat investigations more broadly. The subject is not presumed to be malicious, but is monitored or investigated based on observed actions, access patterns, or risk indicators.
1.1.4 Population
The collective body of individual employees, contractors, affiliates, and or personnel, who comprise an organization's operational workforce and are subject to its policies, controls, and access governance.
1.1.5 Organizational Tollerance
The cumulative level of enforcement (or lack thereof) that an organization applies to policy violations, behavioral deviations, and security infractions. It reflects how consistently the organization upholds its standards of conduct, whether through formal intervention, informal correction, or passive omission. Over time, this tolerance (whether intentional or incidental) shapes workplace norms and signals to the population which behaviors are truly sanctioned, which are negotiable, and which are ignored.
2. The Drift Trajectory
Behavioral drift does not occur in isolation, nor is it limited to an individual subject. Its most pronounced form often emerges across a population, particularly when the lack of enforcement for individual infringements becomes embedded within a subset (such as a team) through proximity, communication, and shared awareness.
2.1 Deviation
For example, a subject may openly discuss using an organization-owned laptop to unlawfully torrent copyrighted media. When this behavior is known among colleagues and goes unchallenged, it does more than highlight a lack of enforcement; it contributes to the normalization of the behavior itself. Over time, this creates a perception within the group that such actions, even if explicitly prohibited, are either tolerated, ignored, or entirely unnoticed by the organization. That perception can lower the threshold for further violations; not just by the original subject, but by others who come to believe they too can act outside policy without consequence. In the context of behavioral drift, we refer to this initial phase as Deviation.
2.2 Normalization
This drift can then extend beyond the originating team into a broader subset of the population through informal communication and observation among colleagues. Over time, it may influence the wider organizational population, gradually reshaping behavioral norms. The result is a tacit culture in which risky behavior appears to be informally permitted (despite formal prohibitions) because the perception of tolerance has become deeply embedded.
This shift in culture does not necessarily stem from overt malice. It may manifest through subtler motivational drivers such as Recklessness (MT015), Opportunism (MT015.001), or Curiosity (MT018); all of which can lead to risk-bearing actions. For example, in an environment where behavioral drift has become institutionalized, the organization may observe an increase in the number of laptops reported as lost or stolen, driven by a population-wide decline in care and accountability. This second phase of drift, where unacceptable behaviors become routine and unremarkable across an entire population, is referred to as Normalization.
2.3 Escalation
Once the perception of organizational tolerance collapses into a ubiquitous permissive culture across the entire population, the risk of harm escalates exponentially over time. At this stage, the organization becomes significantly more vulnerable to overtly malicious motives. A subject, or subset of the population, may begin engaging in Boundary Testing (MT022) to determine the outer limits of acceptable behaviour, potentially progressing toward motives such as Conflicts of Interest (MT021) or Personal Gain (MT005). These motives are enabled by the justified belief that such actions will neither be challenged nor detected.
As long as the population perceives the organization as behaviorally permissive, the likelihood increases that external actors will also identify this condition. This, in turn, raises the risk that opportunistic outsiders may seek to exploit the environment, viewing it as fertile ground for Coercion (MT012), recruitment for activities such as Espionage (MT017), Corporate Espionage (MT005.002) and Third Party Collusion (MT006), or infiltration by installing an insider through the organization's recruitment processes: Joiner (MT001).
Naturally, the rate and nature of risk escalation due to behavioral drift will vary between organizations, influenced by factors such as sector, organizational size, and public visibility or brand awareness. However, as a functional reality, all organizations, regardless of type, will experience a relative increase in risk over time if behavioral drift is left unaddressed.
This third and final phase is referred to as Escalation. As noted earlier, this phase will continue to intensify over time until corrective action is taken. To reset behavioral norms and contain further drift, organizations must orchestrate people, processes, and technology, specifically to detect and manage volume infringements before they evolve into Deviation.
3.The Value of Tracking Volume Infringements
It is possible for an organization to determine where it currently sits within the Deviation → Normalization → Escalation drift trajectory by tracking volume infringements and analyzing their distribution. This begins by identifying individual subjects who have committed low-level violations, then examining workplace links between those subjects, such as being part of the same team, working in the same physical location, or reporting to the same manager. If such links are present, this suggests the organization is operating within the Deviation phase, or transitioning between Deviation and Normalization.
If volume infringements are widespread across multiple teams or the broader population – for example, extensive inappropriate web browsing or broad use of an unapproved collaboration platform. This indicates the organization has entered the Normalization phase. At this stage, violations have become routine and culturally embedded.
If infringements remain widespread but begin to exhibit signs of malicious or willfully negligent motives (such as Boundary Testing) this marks the early stages of Escalation. For instance, a subject might deliberately circumvent IT security controls to test the organization’s response, or exploit the ambiguity of “reasonable personal use” by installing and playing video games during work hours.
Where infringements, whether widespread or isolated, reflect overtly malicious motives and result in material harm to the organization, the environment has progressed to the later stages of Escalation. Examples include sustained insider activity such as corporate espionage or repeated data theft, beyond one-off incidents.
A fundamental aim of any Insider Risk Management program should be to strike a careful balance: maintaining a collaborative and trusting environment, while ensuring that Deviation does not evolve into Normalization. Achieving this balance requires more than reactive enforcement; it depends on timely insight into where the organization currently sits within the Behavioral Drift trajectory.
To achieve this, the organization must first establish mechanisms for tracking volume infringements and associating them with both individual subjects and teams. Without this level of behavioral visibility, there is no reliable way to assess the organization’s position within the Behavioral Drift trajectory or to deploy targeted interventions before escalation occurs. This visibility typically comes from a User Behavior Analytics (UBA) or User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) tool; often an agent-based software solution with integrated dashboarding and reporting capabilities.
One of the earliest benefits of tracking volume infringements is that it enables Insider Threat Investigation Teams to build behavioral profiles of subjects. By mapping patterns of behavior to Articles and Sections in the Insider Threat Matrix, teams can identify appropriate ad hoc detections and preventions tailored to the specific type of offending. This process also allows analysts to establish a risk level for each subject, creating an opportunity to implement proportionate controls and enhanced monitoring where necessary and prevent individual escalation to more serious offending.
4. Culture, Enforcement, and the Invisible Hand
Behavioral drift is shaped not only by individual actions but by how those actions are met (or not met) by the organization. When policy violations are ignored, unevenly enforced, or quietly passed between departments, they send an implicit signal: this is acceptable here. This form of passive reinforcement becomes the invisible hand guiding behavioral drift; accelerating the transition from isolated Deviation to broader Normalization. Without consistent, transparent, and well-integrated enforcement processes, even the best-crafted policies will fail to anchor behavior.
The foundation of any Insider Risk Management program lies in the policies that prohibit specific behaviors or actions and provide the Insider Threat Investigation Team with the authority to detect infringements and enforce those policies.
Typically, these policies center around the organization’s Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). While the structure and language of an effective AUP will be addressed in a separate paper, it is important to note here that the AUP should be treated as a continually evolving document. Insider Threat Investigation Teams must have a clear pathway to provide input into proposed changes, but they should not hold unilateral control. Granting such control risks creating the perception of over-policing and could erode organizational trust.
4.1 The Acceptable Use Policy Advisory Panel
To that end, an AUP Advisory Panel should be established, with executive buy-in, comprising representatives from Human Resources (HR), Legal, employee representative groups (where present), operational cybersecurity teams, and the Insider Threat Investigation Team. This panel should create and maintain mechanisms for soliciting feedback from across the organization and should govern a formal pathway for proposed changes or additions to the AUP. The Insider Threat Investigation Team should follow this same pathway. All panel members should have equal opportunity to evaluate and influence proposed amendments, with changes approved (at minimum) by a simple majority.
Once established, the AUP Advisory Panel becomes the de facto governing authority over the Acceptable Use Policy. By extension, it also assumes a measure of governance over the Insider Threat Investigation Team; legitimizing detection and enforcement activity by formally delegating the enforcement function to that team. This delegation should be explicitly recorded in policy, serving as a formal warrant for the team’s activity. Doing so ensures clarity of mandate and addresses any potential legitimacy concerns that may arise, particularly in sensitive scenarios such as enforcement actions involving senior members of staff, or where such actions form part of proceedings in an industrial tribunal or in civil or criminal court cases.
4.2 Human Resources and Managers
The AUP Advisory Panel should also define a mechanism for bi-directional communication between Resources (HR) and the Insider Threat Investigation Team. This link is essential, as it allows HR to share information, such as Joiner, Mover, and Leaver (JML) events, with the Insider Threat Investigation Team, enabling the team to compare this data against tracked volume infringements to help establish a risk profile for the subject in question. It also provides a structured pathway for HR to relay information received from managers regarding potential issues or concerns involving a subject.
In turn, Insider Threat Investigation Teams will use this mechanism to escalate infringements to HR in cases where managerial action may be appropriate, or where additional context may aid the team in the course of an investigation.
Over time, this connection between HR and the Insider Threat Investigation function should deepen, allowing each to become a resource for the other, whether in support of internal investigations or as part of ongoing risk governance.
5. Practical Measures to Disrupt Behavioral Drift
Disrupting behavioral drift requires more than awareness; it demands structured, repeatable intervention processes that reinforce policy boundaries across the entire population. Without visible and proportionate enforcement, drift will continue unchecked, and unacceptable behaviors will become normalized. To prevent this, organizations must implement a formalized escalation framework, designed to apply consistently at all levels; from entry-level staff to senior executives, including those within the Insider Threat Investigation Team itself.
This escalation framework should begin by defining thresholds of severity, which determine when infringements are escalated to Human Resources (HR) by the Insider Threat Investigation Team. For example, where a subject commits a first-time volume infringement, it may be appropriate for the Insider Threat Investigation Team to manage the entire process: detection, investigation, and resolution – without HR involvement. However, where the nature of the infringement is more severe, or where multiple infractions occur, HR should be notified either immediately or at a defined escalation point in parallel with the investigation.
A practical example of such a framework might be:
Instance | HR Involvement | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
First volume infringement | No | First instance warning issued by Insider Threat Investigation Team |
Second volume infringement | No | Second instance warning issued by Insider Threat Investigation Team |
Third volume infringement | Yes | HR leads and instructs the Insider Threat Investigation Team on next steps |
Severe infringement | Yes | HR leads and instructs the Insider Threat Investigation Team on next steps |
The first and second instance warnings can take the form of pro forma emails, using language agreed upon by the AUP Advisory Panel, with input from both HR and Legal teams.
Defining what constitutes a severe infringement can be a dynamic process, rather than assigning specific infringement types to fixed severity categories. This is because the seriousness of certain behaviors can vary significantly based on context, making hardcoded thresholds impractical. The detailed methodology for achieving this level of contextual classification is beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in a future publication.
It is worth restating that the escalation framework must apply to the entire population, without exception. Allowing exceptions creates the potential for pockets of Normalization to develop within the organization, which may eventually lead to broader Deviation across the population. Over time, inconsistent enforcement becomes visible, undermining the authority of the Insider Threat Investigation Team and exposing the organization to perceptions of favoritism or bias. In extreme cases, this could result in formal complaints, including accusations of bullying or selective enforcement being directed at the Insider Threat Investigation Team.
That said, an extension of the AUP Advisory Panel (referred to as the AUP Exception Panel) may be established to provide a transparent and formal process for receiving and reviewing requests for exemption from specific sections of the AUP, for an individual or a team. This panel would be responsible for granting or denying exemptions based on their alignment with legitimate business needs, balanced against the organization’s risk appetite and the calculated risk level of the subject(s) concerned. When managed transparently and applied consistently, such a process can mitigate the damaging effects of inconsistent enforcement. Further exploration of the AUP Exception Panel and its operational design is beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in a future publication.
6. Integrating Behavioral Drift into Insider Risk Programs
For behavioral drift to be managed effectively, it must be embedded into the operational rhythm of the Insider Threat Investigation Team. This means treating volume infringements not merely as isolated events, but as components of broader behavioral patterns that can be tracked, reviewed, and acted upon over time. One practical method for achieving this is the establishment of a recurring Volume Infringement Review (VIR); a structured monthly review focused exclusively on volume infringements.
6.1 Monthly Volume Infringement Review (MVIR)
A Monthly Volume Infringement Review (MVIR) tracks all volume infringements of a specific type across the previous calendar month. The types of infringements monitored must be of a risk level where it is acceptable for the delay between infringement and detection to be, at most, one month. The purpose of the MVIR is not simply to track, but to detect and resolve each incident, grouped by infringement type and subject. Examples of suitable volume infringement types include:
Inappropriate browsing
Any browsing activity deemed inappropriate for the organizational environment, such as accessing pornographic or gambling websites.
Pirated media
Any activity related to the procurement or possession of unlawfully obtained copyrighted material, including the presence of files with names or extensions consistent with torrented media on the subject’s file system.
Unapproved cloud-synced note-taking application installs
Any application not approved by the organization that enables syncing of notes with a third-party cloud service, such as Evernote or Obsidian.
Unapproved encrypted messenger application installs
Any application not approved by the organization that provides encrypted messaging capabilities, such as WhatsApp or Signal.
Unapproved encrypted messenger web application access
Any web activity indicating that the subject has accessed or used an unapproved web service offering encrypted messaging capabilities, such as WhatsApp.
Unapproved generative AI model access
Any web activity indicating that the subject has accessed or used an unapproved web service or application offering generative AI model services.
For example, Subject X may have navigated to an inappropriate website multiple times during the month; this would be treated as a single incident under inappropriate browsing. If the Subject X also downloaded pirated media to their organizational laptop during the same period, it would constitute a separate incident under pirated media, despite involving the same subject. Incidents are grouped first by infringement type, then by individual subject, provided they occurred within the calendar month in question. In this example, Subject X would receive two resolutions (such as warning emails) one for inappropriate browsing and one for pirated media.
By combining the tracking of volume infringements with enforcement (detection and resolution), the risk of duplicated investigative effort is removed, as is the risk of a subject receiving enforcement action for the same infringement more than once.
The establishment of an MVIR consolidates nominated volume infringement detections and resolutions into a single, structured process. It also enables the organization to track subjects who offend and subsequently re-offend over time. The MVIR can be aligned with the escalation framework described in Section 5, providing a mechanism to address behavioral drift through consistent enforcement and to prevent drift from escalating from Deviation to Normalization, and beyond.
Additionally, the MVIR generates valuable data on individual subjects that can be used to assess subject-specific risk. When combined with information from the bi-directional relationship with HR and other relevant organizational stakeholders, it contributes to a more comprehensive risk profile for each subject.
The MVIR can also provide supporting evidence for ad hoc enhanced monitoring or justify managerial action against a subject in cases of repeat offending or more serious infringements, should they occur.
Extensive guidance on the specific implementation, technology, and operational aspects of volume infringement tracking within an MVIR falls outside the scope of this paper.
7. Closing Reflections on Behavioral Drift
We theorize behavioral drift is a subtle but measurable trajectory that, if left unaddressed, can gradually erode organizational controls and increase insider risk exposure. As this paper has explored, drift is not a binary event but a progressive journey from Deviation to Normalization and ultimately to Escalation. Its root causes lie not in catastrophic acts but in repeated low-level violations; the volume infringements that accumulate and normalize behavioral deviations across an organization’s population.
Detecting and managing this trajectory demands a deliberate operational response. An organization must establish clear enforcement baselines, apply them consistently across all levels (including the Insider Threat Investigation Team itself) and embed enforcement mechanisms that are both structured and proportionate. The implementation of a Monthly Volume Infringement Review (MVIR) provides a practical methodology for consolidating detections, preventing duplicated enforcement effort, and creating a structured dataset from which behavioral patterns and re-offending subjects can be identified over time.
Crucially, the approach outlined in this paper positions behavioral drift monitoring not as a punitive surveillance activity, but as a trust-preserving, risk-reduction discipline. The goal is to intervene early, before drift accelerates, and to apply proportionate resolution pathways that respect employee dignity while protecting organizational integrity. Insider Threat Investigation Teams, working in partnership with Human Resources and under the governance of an AUP Advisory Panel, play a central role in translating policy into enforcement reality.
This paper has focused specifically on the treatment of volume infringements as an early and actionable signal of behavioral drift. Further work will explore the integration of additional behavioral indicators, contextual risk factors, and system telemetry to build a more comprehensive behavioral risk model. As the insider threat landscape continues to evolve, organizations that adopt structured drift monitoring as part of their insider risk programs will be better positioned to maintain trust, detect early warning signs, and respond decisively before behaviors escalate into material harm.
At Forscie, we believe that in an environment where trust constitutes the final perimeter, the structured identification and management of behavioral drift remains one of the most critical safeguards an organization can deploy.
